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Tiebout's theory of local expenditures predicts the efficient provision of local tax and expenditure bundles via market forces occur when individuals “vote with their feet” (Tiebout 1956). Private amenity choices may distort mar...
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Tiebout's theory of local expenditures predicts the efficient provision of local tax and expenditure bundles via market forces occur when individuals “vote with their feet” (Tiebout 1956). Private amenity choices may distort market signals to local governments. Thus we conduct a conjoint experiment to explore how citizens make choices among hypothetical apartment homes, varying public and club good attributes. This allows us to vary both apartment community and city amenities independently to determine whether private club or public amenities are more influential in shaping residency choices. Regardless of the quality of city services, citizens on average are willing to pay for an additional layer of safety provided by an apartment complex. We conclude that the city's tax expenditure bundle is not the only consideration in residential location choice, suggesting that there is disruption in the efficient provision of public goods.
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Matching grants are a prevalent mechanism for funding environmental, conservation, and natural resource projects. However, economists have largely been silent regarding the potential benefits of these mechanisms at increasing volu...
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Matching grants are a prevalent mechanism for funding environmental, conservation, and natural resource projects. However, economists have largely been silent regarding the potential benefits of these mechanisms at increasing voluntary contributions. To examine the behavioral responses to different match levels, this research uses controlled laboratory experiments with generically framed instructions and introduces a general-form matching-grant mechanism, referred to as the proportional contribution mechanism (PCM). Results show that contributions are positively correlated with both the match and the induced value of the public good even when a dominant strategy is free-riding. An implication of this partial demand revelation result is that manifestations of this type of "helping hand" social preference should be counted in benefit-cost analysis.
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In this study, the enhancing parameter represented the value of the public goods to the public in public goods game, and was rescaled to a Fermi-Dirac distribution function of critical mass. Public goods were divided into two cate...
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In this study, the enhancing parameter represented the value of the public goods to the public in public goods game, and was rescaled to a Fermi-Dirac distribution function of critical mass. Public goods were divided into two categories, consumable and reusable public goods, and their coevolution with cooperative behavior was studied. We observed that for both types of public goods, cooperation was promoted as the enhancing parameter increased when the value of critical mass was not very large. An optimal value of critical mass which led to the best cooperation was identified. We also found that cooperations emerged earlier for reusable public goods, and defections became extinct earlier for the consumable public goods. Moreover, we observed that a moderate depreciation rate for public goods resulted in an optimal cooperation, and this range became wider as the enhancing parameter increased. The noise influence on cooperation was studied, and it was shown that cooperation density varied non-monotonically as noise amplitude increased for reusable public goods, whereas decreased monotonically for consumable public goods. Furthermore, existence of the optimal critical mass was also identified in other three regular networks. Finally, simulation results were utilized to analyze the provision of public goods in detail. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Abstract Public health programs began as an attempt to fight infectious diseases that are difficult to address without collective action. But the concept and practice of public health has ballooned to encompass an expanding list o...
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Abstract Public health programs began as an attempt to fight infectious diseases that are difficult to address without collective action. But the concept and practice of public health has ballooned to encompass an expanding list of controversial public policy goals ranging from reducing obesity to raising self-esteem. As the list of controversial goals expands, support for “public health” measures contracts. I’ll briefly defend the view that we should define public health as the provision of health-related public goods. I’ll then show that being a health-related public good is not a sufficient condition for counting as a public health goal, since virtually any private good can be converted into a public good by government fiat. This is the conversion problem, which challenges the way we ordinarily think about public goods and public health.
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Proponents of the public goods argument ('PGA') seek to ground the authority of the state on its putative indispensability as a means of providing public goods. But many of the things we take to be public goods - including many of...
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Proponents of the public goods argument ('PGA') seek to ground the authority of the state on its putative indispensability as a means of providing public goods. But many of the things we take to be public goods - including many of the goods commonly invoked in support of the PGA - are actually what we might term publicized goods. A publicized good is any whose 'public' character results only from a policy decision to make some (otherwise private) good freely and universally available. This fact poses complications for the PGA, insofar as the set of possible publicized goods is quite extensive indeed.
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In this paper, we investigate how the choice environment affects contribution behavior in settings with multiple public goods. Specifically, we design a novel experiment that uses a standard voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) ...
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In this paper, we investigate how the choice environment affects contribution behavior in settings with multiple public goods. Specifically, we design a novel experiment that uses a standard voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) game, except that subjects face multiple simultaneous VCMs, each with a different marginal per capita return (MPCR). We study two treatments-one with constrained contribution choices and one with a richer set of options-finding that the constrained choice environment yields higher payoffs. As a virtue of our design, we are able to decompose these payoff differences into two separate channels: differences in contribution levels versus differences in the cost effectiveness of contributions. Although the first channel is typically the primary focus of public good analyses, we offer unique insights by showing that cost-effectiveness also plays an important role in shaping welfare outcomes in settings with multiple public goods. We find that costineffective contributions significantly diminish payoffs in the richer choice environment-a result with important implications for modern charity and crowdfunding platforms, where donors are faced with an ever-growing number of charitable causes to consider. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Green-electricity programs provide an opportunity to study private provision of an environmental public good in a field setting. The first part of this paper develops a theoretical framework to analyze household decisions about vo...
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Green-electricity programs provide an opportunity to study private provision of an environmental public good in a field setting. The first part of this paper develops a theoretical framework to analyze household decisions about voluntary participation in green-electricity programs. We consider different participation mechanisms and show how they relate to existing theory on either pure or impure public goods. The models are used to examine the implications of participation mechanisms for the level of public-good provision. The second part of the paper provides an empirical investigation of actual participation decisions in two green-electricity programs—one based on a pure public good and the other based on an impure public good. The data come from original household surveys of participants and nonparticipants in both programs, along with utility data on household electricity consumption. The econometric results are interpreted in the context of the theoretical models and are compared to other studies of privately provided public goods.
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The dominance of agency theory can reduce our collective scope to analyse private equity in all its diversity and depth. We contribute to theorisation of private equity by developing a contrasting perspective that draws on a rich ...
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The dominance of agency theory can reduce our collective scope to analyse private equity in all its diversity and depth. We contribute to theorisation of private equity by developing a contrasting perspective that draws on a rich tradition of virtue ethics. In doing so, we juxtapose 'private equity' with 'public good' to develop points of rhetorical and analytical contrast. We develop a typology differentiating various forms of private equity, and focus on the 'take private' form. These takeovers are where private equity funds are used to buy all a firm's publicly listed shares. Take private deals reduce reporting requirements and lessen the amount of public scrutiny a firm comes under. They allow greater control of a firm's assets and resources but also have effects in terms of the wider social fabric. The 'public good' and virtue ethics offer an alternative basis for theorisation of these deals. This provides a needed contrast to accounts of private equity based on agency theory.
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The author extends the work of Holt and Laury (1997) on a simple noncomputerized card game for teaching the essential aspects of public goods theory. He suggests a course of several lectures and discusses the behavior of subjects ...
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The author extends the work of Holt and Laury (1997) on a simple noncomputerized card game for teaching the essential aspects of public goods theory. He suggests a course of several lectures and discusses the behavior of subjects in various game sessions. Among other things, the results provide experimental evidence with respect to the private provision of public goods. Other aspects discussed include anomalous behavior patterns and a critical review of the game. He provides student exercises in the appendix.
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This paper examines the provision of a pure local public good in jurisdictions that are spaced evenly along an infinite line. Each jurisdiction either supplies the local public good, or else its residents travel to another jurisdi...
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This paper examines the provision of a pure local public good in jurisdictions that are spaced evenly along an infinite line. Each jurisdiction either supplies the local public good, or else its residents travel to another jurisdiction to consume the local public good. The equilibrium spacing between jurisdictions which supply the local public good, which can be uneven (varying between a minimum spacing and a maximum spacing for given exogenous parameters), can be greater than, equal to, or less than the socially optimal spacing.
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